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According to one famous postulate, ‘an unexamined life is not worth living’. The words, 
originally attributed to Socrates, gained notoriety at Sydney University, where they were 
appropriated as a polemical exhortation to successive generations of eager students by 
Professor John Anderson. More recently their spirit has been dramatised by the autodidact 
Wesley Antill, in Murray Bail’s fourth novel The Pages (2008), in response to the insistence 
of a lecturer from the same department that the would-be philosopher must ‘become a 
singular person’ (65).1 How Antill transforms this adage into deeds, and his legacy to 
posterity, in the form of piles of manuscript pages, is Bail’s ostensible subject. Yet answers to 
such important questions as what precisely his life amounts to, or the purpose of his 
miscellaneous jottings that constitute the book’s concluding section, have proven 
tantalisingly elusive. ‘These fragments are presented as the sum total of the philosopher’s 
disjointed lifetime of thinking. Or maybe they are a tracing of the land itself speaking 
hesitantly. Equally they may be simply the outcome of Sophie’s erratic coffee-spill. Who 
knows? The novel ends by remaining a work in progress’ (Krauth 11).2 Certainly the 
narrative avoids unambiguous closure, and achieves that ‘resistance’ to facile readings that 
Bail has long admired in other works of art.3 Nevertheless, as I hope to show, the careful 
orchestration of its diverse scenes and five main characters provides important clues to this 
final section and the work’s overall import, while through the fate of Wesley Bail is able to 
highlight the issue of philosophy’s potential contemporary role, as well as to probe abiding 
existential dilemmas. 
 
Seen in the wider context of the Australian’s oeuvre, The Pages reads like a summation of 
many of his preoccupations. Rather than representing a ‘turn’ towards philosophy, its 
prominence here reflects a long-standing, serious engagement with the discipline.4 
Epistemological and ontological issues have been a mainstay of Bail’s fiction, as well as a 
subject for protracted study and a cause of domestic acrimony: ‘You think you’re so smart, 
reading all that philosophy ... You think you know everything. And reading out from that 
book of Hinduism, saying how good it is. Phoney! You don’t believe anything beautiful, 
you’re so harsh’ (N17).5 This tirade is lent credence by being jotted down for further 
reflection in his notebooks, where Bail also acknowledged, after more than two decades as a 
full-time writer: ‘Psychology and philosophy: too much of one, not enough of the other’ 
(N304)—referring presumably to his attachment to the novel of ideas, rather than 
psychological probing, which was already signalled in Homesickness (1980).6 Its plot 
consists largely of a series of unpredictable visits to overseas museums, real and imagined, by 
an eclectic group of Australian tourists. Yet an attentive reading of these apparently random 
events reveals an authorial concern with mutability, self-knowledge and Australian identity 
(Attridge, Ommundsen, Wilson). His tourists describe their antipodean homeland as a place 
of ‘nothing really yet’ (H393), its people as given to quipping to hide unease at their own 
emptiness (H297), while their shared predicament is arguably represented by Violet Hopper 
wandering confused in a London maze, whose hedges are cut to spell out ‘Nosce te’, or know 
yourself (H111): according to antiquity the irreducible basis of all knowledge. Though his 
tourists fail repeatedly to achieve a sovereign vantage-point from which they can make sense 
of their experience, the quest for one emerges as a leitmotif in Bail’s later novels, nowhere 
more starkly than in The Pages.7 
 
Also The Pages is arguably the product, at least in part, of an authorial wish to make a final, 
creative reckoning with existence. In published extracts from recent notebooks, time’s 
winged chariot is audibly nearer. ‘You’re here briefly—work, give shape’ (N260) reads one 
clipped entry, with its distillation suggesting that not a moment was to be lost, and the 
concluding extract sums up this more sombre mood: ‘No use saying: If only we could live 
longer, there is not enough time etc. The brevity of life is in the design; it applies to every one 
of us’ (N306). This heightened awareness of ‘tempus fugit’ conjecturally fed into Bail’s 
unremarked advocacy of the combative generalisation. In the programmatic essay, 
‘Continental shift’, in which he sets forth his preference for fiction that embraces speculation 
of all sorts, comment and bold invention, Bail is unstinting in his praise of ‘fearless 
“generalisers”’ (34). Their pronouncements ‘send timid and ordinary minds rushing for the 
exits’, and constitute a stark intellectual challenge to the remaining readers. 
The bold assertion coming in at an unexpected angle: it forces the reader to sit 
up, and either agree or not. It can be as jolting as a slap across the face. A writer 
sometimes can gain satisfaction only by provoking a duel. By ‘generalising’, 
these writers throw off an infectious energy ... How does he know? Is there 
sufficient truth in it? Probably it cannot merely be dismissed. (‘Continental shift’ 
34) 
Bail’s supporting examples drawn from European literature make no distinction between the 
author and narrator. Nor is any clearly signalled in The Pages, which is studded with 
sweeping generalisations, intended presumably to provoke thought and debate.8 There, too, 
Wesley foregrounds one of the author’s recurring concerns: 
 
The puzzle can never change: ‘How do I relate to the world and to that which I 
call my life?’ 
  Except it needs to be generalised. (196)9 
 
And generalised it is through the fates of the five main protagonists, while the vexed local 
issue of a land apparently inimical to intellectual pursuits is revisited in terms of 
philosophy.10  
 
The Pages is a modern-day fable about the dilemmas of knowledge and personal credos, 
which offers lessons of individual as well as national import. Its setting is an indeterminate 
pastoral hinterland, a day’s drive west of Sydney, where unlikely situations are thinkable, as 
well as mythic stories in ‘the broadest sense’ (N282).11 Conceptually it is built around, and 
dramatises, antithetical endeavours to make sense of reality, with the opposition of reason 
and imagination, explored in Eucalyptus and earlier works, being replaced by philosophy and 
the cognate disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis.12 Two women from Sydney, a 
lecturer in philosophy, Erica Hazelhurst, and her friend, the psychoanalyst Sophie Perloff, 
drive to the country property of the Antills (‘a name with a history, a name stuffed to the gills 
with squatter connotations’ [20]). The present generation consisted of Wesley, the eldest, his 
brother Roger, and their sister Lindsey. Spurning ‘the fine art of wool-classing’ (42), Wesley 
broke with tradition to seek broader knowledge in Sydney, first in the inner suburbs, then in 
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numerous lecture theatres, before narrowing his focus to philosophy and resolving to make an 
original contribution to the field. A third, crucial response to existence is an untheorised 
acceptance of nature’s abiding rhythms, enacted in the daily life of the siblings on their rural 
holding. There, as an initial glimpse of the garden suggests, unexpected intersections and 
incidents, ‘implying the presence, surely, of patterns and complexities’ (31), are to be 
reckoned with. 
 
If the novel affords a key to the miscellaneous comments in its final section, then this must be 
deduced from the life-choices it depicts, as well as from the traditional link between 
philosophy and personal conduct—currently out of favour in the academy but not forgotten 
by Bail.13 The Pages ends, after all, with the adages: ‘To live simply and quietly is almost a 
philosophy’ and ‘We are philosophers; we cannot help being’ (199). Here Wesley comes 
close to articulating the traditional identification of philosophy with the actions and lives of 
its proponents. The death of Socrates is narrated by Plato as the capstone on, and vindication 
of, a distinctive way of thought and existence. Diogenes’ world-vision is synonymous with 
his domicile in a barrel. From its Western inception in Athens and Rome, the ‘philosophical 
life was envisaged as a choice detectable through the events and decisions of biography’ 
(Miller 10). The thinker was a practitioner, as well as directly concerned with the translation 
of his ideas into Praxis. The obverse of this is ‘the contemporary perception that philosophy 
is best understood as a purely technical discipline, revolving around specialized issues in 
semantics and logic’ (Miller 6). Marx’s famous call for the reintegration of theory and Praxis 
signalled not only the birth of a revolutionary program, but also the distance professional 
philosophy had moved away from its classical origins—an estrangement interrogated and 
contested in The Pages.14 
 
The academic parameters of thought, and its sequestration from daily life, are represented by 
three carefully chosen members of the Philosophy Department at Sydney University. The 
blighted and blighting nature of the current discipline is signalled by its leader, Professor 
L.K. Thursk. Dressed in the livery of academic freedom, ‘pullover and bulky shoes’, that is 
more suited to the banks of the Cam or walking on the heath than to Sydney’s clammy 
humidity, L.K. has a well-honed repertoire of dignity-conferring mannerisms. A profile is 
presented to supplicants, hands are pointed under his chin (like ‘an Indian prince wondering 
whether to give salaams’), and even his most banal utterances are interspersed with a 
ponderous ‘hierarchy of throat-clearings’ (16). These suggest the difficulty of articulating 
profound thoughts (‘for much of what composed the world was unsayable’ [16]), while 
additional gravitas is afforded by the legend of his yet-to-be completed life’s work, a ‘long-
awaited study of George Sorel’ (16). Erica discerns here the ‘fussy drapery’ of a bachelor’s 
existence; the narrator the props and mannerisms of an academic sham: ‘He was like a 
plumber who had lost his tools’ (16). The aura of learning long ago replaced the substance. 
Seated in a venerable building, supposedly ‘weathered and worn smooth by the never-ending 
revision of ideas’ (17), his hollowness and non-productivity escape public scrutiny and 
censure, while time, become ‘a honeyed substance’ and embalmer of arcane traditions, has 
lost its usual meaning and urgency: ‘the good professor would happily have waited more or 
less all day for an answer’ (17). In short, this sandstone realm seems inimical to originality: 
‘Erica wondered whether a fresh, angular philosophical method could ever be realised here’ 
(17). 
 
Wesley is spared the longueurs of Thursk, but has the misfortune of encountering pedestrian 
Renmark, who seems equally impervious to the weather or original ideas. Always dressed ‘in 
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nothing but an open-necked shirt’ (63), he projects on campus not intellectual rigour or 
Andersonian turbulence, but the hallmarks of once-prized academic amateurism: ‘the rude 
good health of the long walk, the heath, the stout walking stick, and all that’ (63). The initial 
statement made about him is categoric and defining: ‘It was said in the staffroom: “Renmark 
is not remarkable”’ (63). Predictably his lectures are a fund of out-worn but once influential 
theses, which place the discipline almost beyond local reach. First, philosophy is so difficult, 
so profound, as almost to defy utterance, and demands prolonged, intense preparation (64). 
Secondly, he subscribes to the clichéd nexus of setting and mental make-up, dubbing his 
discipline ‘a by-product of the Northern Hemisphere’ (64), fostered by complex social 
conditions, as well as towering peaks, ‘cold sharp air and the path alongside the rushing river’ 
(79)—scarce attributes on the world’s driest continent. Australia is corresponding devoid of 
original thought. Though thus handicapped by birth, impressionable Antill can draw succour 
from the nexus, posited by Renmark, between the existence led and the soaring life of the 
mind—hence Wesley’s later maniacal insistence on creating the appropriate context to think 
and write in, or the slavish replication of hallowed Gothic silhouettes in the central 
quadrangle of Sydney University. These same cloisters, which can pass off asinine assertions 
as inherited wisdom, are arraigned for harbouring nonentities, for breeding prejudices 
detrimental to native talent and for severance from, as well animosity towards, the special 
conditions offered by the New World. 
 
Finally, according to these pen sketches of its salaried guardians, philosophy, as practised in 
the antipodes, is not only second-hand and second-rate but a life-narrowing occupation. 
Renmark’s private life remains shadowy; probably there is virtually nothing to describe. 
Certainly his sexual urges are appeased at Kings Cross ‘down the seedier end’ (68). The sole 
glimpse of him interacting with anyone is with a bottle-blonde: ‘they were negotiating; and 
the lanky lecturer in philosophy followed her up some stairs ... Antill felt a flood of affection 
for the determined shape of Clive Renmark going forward, always forward’ (68). Wesley’s 
hero worship is palpable. Others might see here evidence of an isolated, failed existence, in 
which he is not alone: six of the seven member of Sydney University’s Philosophy 
Department ‘lived alone ... unmarried’ (16). This extraordinary lack of personal sharing and 
involvement is excused by the cliché that ‘the solitary life was known to strengthen clarity of 
thought’, followed by a list of notorious freethinkers, who did much to detach philosophy and 
personal morality from the strictures of religion: ‘Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, 
Spinoza, Simone Weil—and anyway who would live with those sort of people?—and don’t 
forget Diogenes’ (16). Querulous, self-centred and outspoken individualists, ill-adapted to the 
arts of compromise and engaging empathy, many of them conjecturally would have agreed 
with Erica ‘about feelings—this was a really difficult area, without solid foundation, more 
trouble than it was worth; better to keep the lid on feelings’ (5-6). 
 
Hazelhurst, the third member of this august department, is struggling against the effects of a 
stunting education and upbringing. Her family was stoic and taciturn to the point of muteness. 
Her father, a watch-repairer by trade, preferred to scribble amounts owed on a scrap of paper 
rather than utter them to a customer. His profession demanded utilitarian attitudes and a 
concentrated gaze fixed all day on mechanical minutiae—with potentially dehumanising 
consequences encapsulated by a ‘protruding magnifying thing’ fitted to his face, which made 
him repellent even to his daughter (6). Fittingly he died without fuss and only then, with 
personal control disrupted, uttered ‘an unexpected noise, not exactly a word’ (6). These 
domestic lessons in exactitude and repression are reinforced by Erica’s disciplinary training. 
Taught to avoid ‘incomplete or hazy thoughts’ (5), and to dismiss emotions to the category of 
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refractory ‘non-thoughts’ (4), she wonders whether she has ‘become harsh—was she a hard 
woman?’ (5). Although not ‘dessicated’ (72), she is habitually hesitant and avoids personal 
entanglements. ‘Sooner or later every man presented difficulties ... The other person as 
obstacle! It was why she allowed herself to live alone’ (92). Her feelings, however, are 
conflicted. She exudes calm self-containment and formidable intellectuality (18), yet still 
hopes she is ‘attractive to others’ (72). Her innate but understated femininity produces within 
her tensions that are more easily ignored by her male peers. In brief she, like her friend 
Sophie, is also face to face with Antill’s quandary: ‘Now more than anything Erica wanted to 
make sense of her life’ (7). 
 
Potential solutions to this dilemma are offered by psychology and philosophy, and their rival 
claims to knowledge and personal fulfilment are tested through the trajectories of their 
respective acolytes, Wesley and Sophie. She represents an alleged antipodean preference for 
the truth-claims of Freud’s discipline. Whereas abstruse reflection has singularly failed to 
strike vigorous, independent roots in Sydney, a more recent European form of achieving self-
understanding is depicted as having swept all before it, to make ‘Sydney the most 
psychological city in the world’ (10). Here and in numerous related comments, Bail exploits 
to the full the license he accorded ‘fearless “generalisers”’. In former times, the narrator 
continues, the ‘collective stammering of the self’ and ‘general moral darkness and obscurity’ 
found answers in philosophy (8), while ‘the unevenness of everyday life’ provided 
‘proportion or self-correction’ to individual ideas and credos (12). Australian belatedness 
allegedly assured that by then ‘the important philosophical questions had more or less been 
settled’ (9), and that new nostrum, namely ‘psychology, and its vine-like offshoot, 
psychoanalysis’ (10), were on hand. These had great appeal in a society based on economic 
individualism. In place of a recondite intellectual pursuit, a patient had only to delve into the 
self, and strip back layers of socialisation and camouflage to achieve fundamental insights. 
The novel’s verdict on the current vogue of ‘excavation through words’ (11) and on 
unthinking enrolment in the ‘age of the self’ (12) is harsh—like Bail’s judgment on ‘many 
hundreds’ of modish, I-centred narratives, as ‘a kind of applied psychology [that] has taken 
over storytelling, coating it and obscuring the core’ (E24). An entire city is depicted as 
enthralled by, and subscribing to, this talking cure, whereas ‘at the very word “philosophy” 
people in Sydney run away in droves, reach for the revolver; they look down at their shoes, 
they smile indulgently; they go blank’ (9).  
 
The intense, unabashed focus on the self at the centre of the psychoanalytic encounter is 
shown in Sophie Perloff to promote self-absorption and severance from the baffling, wider 
world. Her insularity and tell-tale lack of general curiosity are immediately signalled: she 
‘had never been over the mountains before. And she was forty-three’ (1). Also subsequent 
descriptions highlight the self-enclosed nature of the psychoanalytical enterprise. Its 
practitioners strive to ensure their premises replicate ‘the cave-like atmosphere first tried and 
found to yield interesting results in Vienna’ (10), in order to produce the desired ‘murmuring 
hum ... blending into one, each and every word and sentence circling around the self, nothing 
else’ (11). Sophie, although her given name evokes the Greek for wisdom, and her family 
name the pearl or traditional symbol of enlightenment, is one of Bail’s most confused and 
self-centred characters. All mannerisms, interests and everything in her vicinity lead 
infallibly back to herself—like lost object viewed as ‘clues to herself for someone to follow... 
sunglasses, a glove, keys, books, purse, and, once, her virginity’ (2-3). The jarring inclusion 
of what was formerly a woman’s most prized attribute among a litany of mundane objects 
encapsulates modern relativism, as well as the shifting parameters of moral judgment and 
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guilt over which Sophie now presides. Equally damning is the depiction of psychoanalysis as 
an incubator of endless self-obsession. Hence in Sophie’s case ‘interest in others tends to be 
perfunctory, impatient, showy’ (12), for her consuming impulse is to focus on her ‘own 
attention-requiring state of mind’ (41). 
 
This excessive egotism, which is shared by philosophers, has negative effects that are central 
to the novel’s covert argument. Its main consequences are twofold: an overweening, 
potentially uncompromising sense of self, which makes deep contact with others extremely 
rare, if not impossible, and utter blindness, or indifference, to the predatory dimension of 
one’s behaviour. She first displays a dearth of sympathy on their drive westwards when her 
conversation becomes one long monologue, ‘reeled off’ without regard for Erica, which 
reduces their friendship to ‘a demonstration of familiarity that required no response’ (3). 
Indicative of this disposition, too, is her lack of empathetic connection with men, including 
lovers, as well as a preference for situations that confirm her power (‘the inevitable weakness 
in men, of seeing the effect she had on them’ [25]). Courting and the sexual act aside, ‘Sophie 
found intimacy difficult. She couldn’t sufficiently involve herself’ (25). Hospitality, which 
includes aspects of fellow-feeling, is another no-go area: ‘The psychoanalytical person 
plumps up the pillows and leaves it at that. To extend hospitality to another person subdivides 
aspects of their difficult, hidden self’ (41). Her major problem, in brief, is that ‘she could not 
reach out’ (25). The same self-centred focus also renders her oblivious to personal 
boundaries, the needs of others and social codes. Most seriously, given her position of trust, it 
drives diverse breeches of professional conduct, from her failure ‘to remain neutral, be the 
conduit’ (23) for others’ revelations, to sleeping with a patient, an ex-priest (‘These men are 
fascinating, believe me’ [25]). These infractions culminate in her proposed solution to her 
liaison with a married man: ‘The wife is an irrelevance. She does him no good. My idea is 
that he becomes one of my clients. I consider that a brainwave. I would see him regularly’ 
(168). This, the final vignette of Sophie in the book, constitutes a damning verdict on her, and 
on dangers inherent in her profession. To the end, she remains as divorced from the feelings 
of others as she is from the surrounding countryside—which to her appears lifeless and empty 
(29). Her precious selfhood remains sacrosanct, undivided and a prison. 
 
Pursuing life according to the dictates of modern philosophy proves no easier, and involves a 
similar insistence on the rights of the inviolable ‘I’. In Wesley’s case its first, crucial 
assertion is associated with violence, and marks a decisive break with family traditions that 
spell constraint and deprivation. Home for him means life dictated by the rising sun and 
seasonal cycles, a sprawling homestead with an absent mother, farm duties instead of culture, 
and parents immersed in material pursuits: a father obsessed with horse-flesh as well as 
livestock, and maternal wealth reaped from the production of a new line of shoe polish. The 
adherence to codes and precedents, which figures so prominently in a pastoralist’s life, is also 
a feature of father’s legal retainer, Mr Mannix. His hallmark is ‘motionlessness’ (19) set off 
by precisely calculated gestures, his calling mandates that people be ‘assigned clear, material 
value’ (17). An education in wool-classing would have involved for Wesley preliminary 
inscription in the practical, materialistic mindset shared by these two men, and perhaps led 
eventually to enrolment in conventional, patriarchal attitudes. He rebels. Generational 
conflict escalates into ‘a full-blown shove’, and the eldest offspring, having metaphorically 
killed his father (Clive ‘fell on his knees, kicking up a puff of dust’ [42]), sets off like a 
modern-day version of the New Chum to garner enriching experience, and hopefully reshape 
his own identity and destiny.  
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Wesley may have escaped Clive’s authority, but he has inherited his father’s, and everyman’s 
dilemma, which is the unruliness, unpredictability, and ultimately the menace projected by 
creation. ‘Life is the intruder on thought’ is one recurring version of the issue; another is ‘the 
puzzle’ that precedes it in the same note: ‘The puzzle? What are we doing here? What can be 
described. Et cetera’ (194). Sophie concentrates on Eros to the virtual exclusion of Thanatos, 
or the death drive. Clive and Wesley are unable to do this. Though father does not speak of 
this threat directly, strictly regimented aspects of his existence seem intended to counter 
nature’s waywardness. He has mandated ‘iron laws’ of dining attire (33), and averred 
sweepingly that ‘all a man needs is a preoccupation, preferably involving classification’ (47). 
His own were horse breeding, which attempts to improve on and systematise the vagaries of 
nature, and the ‘solitary pleasure’ (47) of philately, involving known numbers of exempla and 
catalogued variants. Yet Clive’s ordered existence depended on exclusions similar to those 
practiced by professional philosophers. On trips to Sydney, for instance, he made a point of 
not visiting his estranged wife, even when they were residing in the same street (‘it was a few 
minutes from the Astor’ [47]), while stamp collecting does not eradicate all indices of 
incompletion or lack of control. These nag at Wesley, and he imagines the solitary pursuit of 
philately as being ‘centred, unusually, not on the specimens secured in rows, but in the 
contemplation of those that were missing’ (47). His fancied vision of father, ‘from his swivel 
chair’ identifying ‘the gap in the pattern of his life’ (47), serves primarily as self-revelation. It 
anticipates a life-course in which the process of acquiring knowledge (or filling in perceived 
gaps) threatens to become an end in itself, as well as points to deeper unease.  
 
Renmark provides him with a calling, but mortality supplies the undeclared incentive to 
practise it. Tirelessly Antill seeks ‘the occasional truth not revealed in ordinary life’ (82), 
initially in book-lore, later as a hospital porter. Instead he remains a prey to inarticulate, 
primal emotions during a violent struggle with his co-worker, Hendrik Sheldrake, over status 
and territory, then on a visit to his mortally ill antagonist, when he longs to ask: ‘if he was 
afraid. What can it possibly amount to—being alive, on two feet, and being aware of it ... 
coming to an end’ (100). These timeless issues occupy his thoughts, whereas Sheldrake, 
fixated on the shortfall of inherited creeds, has glued the Scriptures to his walls ‘in case I 
forget what a load of baloney it all is. I want to be reminded every day’ (100). An existential 
void opens from which Antill chooses to avert his mind, as he does again in London, where 
he lives unconcernedly with the tangible absence of a comforting faith: ‘the pale shape’ left 
by a former crucifix on the darkened wall’ of his room (118). On two crucial occasions it 
takes a double dose of death to break through this wilful oblivion and alter his life-course. 
First Sheldrake and his mother die on the same day, driving Wesley to the philosophers, in 
vain, ‘to explain turmoil, better still to correct it’ (101). Later the example of Spinoza, even 
though he succumbed to consumption at forty-four, inspires the hope that intellectual 
achievement can transcend mutability, and Antill ‘to create a philosophy so I could die 
happily’ (149). Nevertheless, it requires the deaths of Rosie, in a car accident, and of Clive to 
see him return home and proceed with its composition. 
 
None of the standard philosophical or psychoanalytical/psychological approaches succeed in 
dispelling the deep-seated malaise of the young characters who profess them. Unquestionably 
Antill’s frustrated, alienated existence exemplifies his concluding adage that the philosopher, 
ipso facto, ‘is a dissatisfied person’ (194). His specialist counterpart in Erica is a prey to 
related contradictions and doubts: ‘Nothing much happens in my life. My movements feel 
minimal; and it doesn’t always feel right to me’ (28).  Also Sophie, despite a contrary, 
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unabating drive for self-gratification, fares no better. The facile answers and prescripted 
situations dictated by her self-obsession have not assisted her to make transformative 
connections with others, nor to dispel her own dimly intuited ‘obscurity’ (24). All run the risk 
of being either too self-engrossed or ‘too rigorously theoretical, which allows you not to 
participate in the life’ that surrounds and virtually prods you (74). Yet philosophy can also 
require a practitioner ‘to think clearly about what lay not on the page, but directly in life in 
front of him’ (102). This distinction is categorically made and evaluated in the final four 
sections of the novel. These afford alternating accounts of Erica’s and Wesley’s life-choices, 
which culminate in her assenting to the affirmative attitudes and tender intimacies of Roger 
Antill. She opens herself to existence, whereas Wesley, committed to the notion that more is 
to be learned ‘from study than “life”’, remains isolated, a victim of ‘Tunnel vision’ (191) and, 
physically, prematurely blighted.15 In short, the same living, mutating creation that snatched 
away Rosie affords an alternative to abstruse, theoretical disciplines, as well as a potential 
source of life-wisdom upon which the book’s hopes for humankind arguably hinge. 
 
The land, not crenellated institutions, is Australia’s major resource, and it affords a litmus test 
of character. Here, as the opening line suggests, wonder-inspiring scenes are daily renewed: 
‘AT DAWN—what a word: the beginning of the world all over again’ (1). Yet the 
countryside, which is also subject to climatic and seasonal cycles, partakes of change, 
continuity and death. The challenges and opportunities it offers are therefore diverse. In each 
generation, for example, it implicitly raises questions of purpose and ends, while its perennial 
forces and patterns must be reckoned with constantly on a working station. There exhibitions 
of elemental power range from a violent thunderstorm and flooding to the less spectacular but 
relentless wasting of farm implements and buildings, which ‘return to earth, though not 
entirely’ (94). Predictably Sophie, unable to render herself open or amenable to outside 
influences, is baffled by the silent otherness of the countryside. She cannot wait to return to 
the familiar terrain of the city, whereas Erica responds positively to the fact that every minute 
of their drive took them further away from the known and safely routine. Only for Wesley 
does the pastoral property represent the known and rejected. He much preferred ‘inner-
Sydney—a city of verticals’ to ‘the sweep of the landscape’ (109), or solitary egotism to the 
implied sameness and oneness of his native countryside. Hence he acts the part of a prodigal 
son manqué, not rejoicing in his homecoming, but seeking to erase what it has to offer as 
distracting or superfluous: he ruthlessly takes a chainsaw to a beautiful stand of red gums to 
render the visible terrain as barren and blank as possible. Nevertheless, this pastoral 
landscape can potentially provide what mountains have to the European mind: a place of 
calm remoteness conducive to thought, and ‘a feeling of closeness to the original nature of 
things, the beginning from where an explanation can begin to be constructed’ (104). It also 
affords a sparse arena in which Erica tries ‘to make something meaningful of the conflicting 
mass of impressions, propositions. Et cetera.’ (72) found in Wesley’s notes and her own life. 
 
Crucial to her pastoral education is Wesley’s antithesis in the younger sibling who stayed at 
home, Roger Antill. Separated by seven years, the two brothers were profoundly divided in 
temperament and ‘opinions on every subject under the sun’ (58). Roger is practical, matter-
of-fact and approaches problems with ‘common sense, which he has in spades, comes from 
being on the land’ (58). Behind the clichéd explanation lie acceptance of, and willingness to 
work with, nature’s rhythms—the unqualified ‘gift’ that Holland internalised in Eucalyptus: 
‘it had crept into his body, as it were, and settled, always there’ (E130). Roger apparently has 
a similar ‘natural advantage, which is to be envied’ (E130). It colours his response to every 
incident, and even inflects his speech which, with ‘stops and starts and false trails’ aplenty, 
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seems to follow ‘the contours of the meandering landscape’ (87). Thus a ewe, seemingly on 
the verge of drowning with only its head above water, excites in Erica violent agitation, a 
failed rescue bid and continued consternation, whereas Roger, a man otherwise intent on 
saving his flock (76), seems unperturbed. He prioritises correctly, and focuses on pulling 
Erica out of the river rather than the sheep (91). He and his sister do not seek to micro-
manage their environment, but when necessary leave nature to take its course. They live 
happily with imprecision and gaps, with a landscape devoid of black lines of demarcation 
(109), and with other conditions anathema to those striving after rational explanations. Hence 
the Sydney academic is initially unsettled by Roger: ‘Seated beside her this man consisted of 
a large number of gaps. Everything he did or said was unsatisfactory to Erica, even when they 
saw ahead. . .[the same] sodden sheep struggle out of the shallows, and he said nothing’ (92). 
Later one measure of her progress is acceptance of all his sister embodies: ‘Lindsey was easy 
company. The way she allowed, and even encouraged gaps, imitated the landscape’ (170).16 
It will be Roger’s, not Wesley’s, approach to life that changes the course of Erica’s existence. 
 
To reach this relaxed, acquiescent state, and the wider potential it portends, the hard selfhood 
towards which Wesley aspired must yield in Erica to softness and a more porous self. A 
foretaste of this ‘weakening’ comes on arrival at the homestead when she is overcome by 
faintness: ‘Erica, with no warning, had a dizzy spell. She almost keeled over’ (35). In the 
country her feelings oscillates in response to antithetical influences. Typically the task of 
assessing Wesley’s accumulated writings reinforces disciplinary firmness and closure 
(‘Concentrating, she hardened. It was something she was aware of’ [171]), whereas outside 
she demonstrates a growing receptivity towards creation that involves a willingness to 
subdivide, merge and even lose aspects of the self. A silent plea ‘to be humble’ (70) 
accompanies acceding to the heat and ‘wider silence ... surrounding, swarming and entering 
her’ (70), and is a prelude to ‘allow[ing] herself to blend into gullies’ (88). Full immersion, 
however, comes only with a recasting of the familiar lost-in-the-bush motif. One afternoon, 
on emerging tired after perusing Wesley’s manuscripts but resolved to embrace 
‘dispassionate logic’ and ‘expressionless firmness’ (172), she loses first her sunglasses, then 
her bearings in the local landscape. Her vaunted mental processes land her, virtually 
unprotected, in the notoriously dangerous Australian outback, with her life perhaps at risk. 
There, although she may sit ‘on a very large rock—to “gather her thoughts”’ (173), it is 
Roger who gathers her up, drives ‘in the opposite direction to where she had been heading’ 
(174), and implicitly teaches her a lesson in inter-dependence and empathetic communion. 
 
Fuelling Erica’s original inertia and defensiveness was apprehension of vulnerability and the 
unknown. She is keenly aware of a pattern in herself of ‘remaining friendly enough’ but 
holding back, for the opposite ‘would mean opening up—to what exactly?’ (36). The novel 
provides diverse answers. Her rewards for incrementally relaxing the tight defences that 
preserve the self constantly augment. First she perceives how paddocks ‘bulge’ (81), then the 
‘curvaceous ... casual harmony over gradual distances’ of the earth (88). Later she discerns 
from a window of Wesley’s shed intimations of a bond that subsists throughout creation, to 
which Wesley was blind: ‘Gradual were the patterns, no limestone outcrops, gorges, river, no 
patch of green grass; no sharp lines of black, either. Gradualness possessed an endlessness’ 
(109). Nature of course can, and has, presented other and more fearsome faces, but even these 
causes of personal consternation are arguably much defused, when integrated within an 
endless schema. Thus Erica, while sitting on the verandah’s liminal space, shares at last the 
younger Antills’ ease with gaps of all kinds, and registers a major change in herself: ‘It was 
the general immensity she was no longer afraid of. “Over-arching”, a word she had used in 
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her philosophical work before’ (177). Now the woman trained in precise, abstract 
formulations is obliged to recognise not only that ‘out here ... everything already existed 
without description’ (76), but also what ‘over-arching’ always implied: a subsuming, 
potentially benign creation in which she, too, plays a part.  
 
Instead of seeking in vain to understand and control the whys and wherefores of existence, 
humans, according to The Pages, need to embrace all its phases and cycles. Typically they 
seek to ‘frame’ or ‘contain’ events, to borrow the terms of a professional picture-framer 
(181), with plans, suppositions and philosophies, with fences, buildings and windscreens. The 
resulting constructs are inevitably ‘one remove from truth’ or actuality (181), and liable to 
disappoint. The formulator can be left particularly vulnerable, as when the sudden death of 
Rosie tragically shatters Wesley’s framing, grand design, precipitating his mental breakdown. 
Something, however, remains of individual effort, whether in perishable manuscript pages, or 
outside in scattered ‘signs barely decipherable, as if under water’ (88), while existence in its 
entirety is not diminished, for like the landscape ‘after rain it returns changed, but basically 
the same’ (88). The stark antithesis to framing is ‘To Be There and To Wonder’, another 
Wesley adage that captures Hazelhurst’s attention (128). Evidence of having surmised its 
worth emerges in her new-found power to wonder at nature’s repeated marvels, when the 
dawn of the book’s opening page yields towards its conclusion to sunset: ‘the sky down the 
end screaming out heat and immensity, the great cycle of day turning into night, cockatoo-
grey feathery, and pink-tinted, until gradually, suddenly, closing down’ (169). In joying at 
this daily-repeated movement through gradual transitions to a sudden ‘closing down’, Erica 
in effect is embracing the enactment of mutability, together with the full cycle and many 
stations of life, against the backdrop of open-ended ‘immensity’. 
 
The Pages, true to Bail’s long-held aspiration of creating thought-provoking works that resist 
immediate and easy comprehension, arguably proposes an ideal interchangeability between 
philosophies and individual existences only dimly intuited in Wesley’s concluding notes. The 
final pronouncement, ‘we are philosophers; we cannot help being’ (199) is almost tantamount 
to grasping, as in classical times, that to act is potentially to be a philosopher. In stark 
contrast, as Erica learns and Wesley unwittingly demonstrates, today’s academic discipline 
rests on an arid and scarcely sustainable dichotomy of life and thought, and tends to promote 
solitary, eccentric existences. Their antithesis is Roger, whose first words significantly are 
‘I’ve been to the funeral’ (61), and who embodies Praxis. His actions constitute a life-
philosophy that embraces all creation’s vicissitudes and harmonies. His concluding 
‘philosophy’ of the hand, for instance, although theoretically jejune, involves the direct 
translation of thought, or more accurately ‘wishes of the mind’ (192), into practice. Here 
emotional impulses trump rational dissection, and usher in Erica’s instinctive acquiescence to 
his touch. An earlier, unattributed postulate that ‘for philosophy to be possible today it would 
have to begin afresh...where there was no thinking, no philosophy’ (36) has in effect been 
achieved, not by meditating in remote European fastnesses, but in the Australian countryside, 
under local conditions which typically give rise to ‘thoughts put into practice’ (161). The 
final glimpse given of Erica is unambiguously affirmative. By subtly changing her ‘frame of 
reference’ to embrace what cannot be quantified and logically analysed, by emerging from 
the chrysalis of constraining codes and upbringing (‘She felt different. Something was going 
on’ [193]), she has come to see existence, not as ‘the intruder on thought’, but as its 
revelation-rich instigator: ‘And through the windscreen and at the side remained the 
landscape, warm, golden and still, which she hadn’t until then seen before’ (194).  
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1 An extended version of this essay can be found in Michael Ackland, The Experimental Fiction of Murray Bail 
(Cambria 2012), in the Cambria Australian Literature Series. Series editor: Susan Lever  
http://www.cambriapress.com/cambriaseries.cfm?template=87. 
2 Similar vagueness and uncertainty was a feature of virtually all reviews. For further examples see Flanery, 
Huxley, Simms and Wallace-Crabbe. 
3 This desire, arguably implicit in his preference for the novel of ideas, emerges also from various statements 
and jottings, like the following Notebook entry: 
The importance of resistance: without it the viewer, or the reader, hardly contributes. Going from Cézannes to 
the roomful of Cossington Smiths—resistance was what was missing. After Mallarmé, Valéry ‘could no longer 
suffer impure poems, which could be understood at once and without resistance. Everything seemed naïve and 
slack after they had read him’. (N274) 
4 Philosophy has been by no means the only cognate discipline to attract his interest. Apart from literature in 
translation (‘Continental shift’), Bail has also drawn repeated inspiration from the visual arts (Ackland, 
‘Matisse’). 
5 N indicates a page reference to Notebooks, H to Homesickness, E to Eucalyptus. Unattributed parenthetical 
page references to Bail’s work are to The Pages. 
6 This preference was part of his revolt against the once-dominant Australian realist tradition (Chisholm 41-42, 
Davidson 274-76). Unlike major English authors, their European peers, he argued, were ‘concerned as much 
with invention and speculation as with tracing the usual psychological contours’ of protagonists, and with 
securing for themselves creative elbow room (‘Continental shift’ 34). 
7 The commanding vantage-point can assume physical form, such as Uncle Vern’s home in the Adelaide Hills 
(Holden’s Performance), or philosophical and methodological form, such as the frequent attachment of his 
characters to empiricism and classification. 
8 According to Bail, ‘art will always be a rendition of the self’ (‘I Am’ 267), by which he means a ‘reflection’ of 
‘what is within’, done ‘without ... compromise, whatever the cost’ (‘I Am’ 267). Reflection, of course, does not 
denote mimetic recording, but rather the subjective processing and imaginative refraction that make McCahon’s 
Elias series, for example, ‘among the most intimate extensions of himself’ (‘I Am’ 266). 
9 Wesley, of course, offers a satirical refraction of many of Bail’s own traits and preoccupations, such as 
pedantry, intellectual pretensions and ambitious schemes, and of the author’s own preferred work-and life-
strategy of dedicated withdrawal. Craven, noting the autobiographical dimension of Wesley’s depiction, 
described this ‘wonderful book’ as ‘a fictional self-portrait that seems to cost not less than everything’ (23)—
whatever that may mean. 
10 On Bail’s earlier engagement with these concerns, especially in Holden’s Performance, see Ackland, 
‘Politics’ and Dixon. More generally, the negative evaluation of local intellectual capacities is a manifestation of 
cultural cringe and imperial condescension, as well as a wide-spread conclusion drawn from the antipodean 
pursuit of material self-betterment and sport. In 1880 Henry Kendall, for instance, lamented the country’s 
obsession with sporting over intellectual brawn in ‘An Idol of New Barataria’ (Ackland, Kendall 101-4), while 
in ‘Middleton’s Rouseabout’ Henry Lawson famously characterised Andy, his type of the Coming Man, as: 
‘Hasn’t any opinions/Hasn’t any “idears”’ (Ackland, Penguin 263). 
11 According to Bail, ‘without the underlying strength of myth, fiction may well be pleasant and interesting, and 
perhaps even topical, but lacking in deeper-depth, and so, portability’ (N288). 
12 The Pages does not distinguish rigorously between the two, and although psychologists and psychoanalysts 
have very different training, procedures and career structures, Bail lumps them together as practitioners of the 
talking cure and promoters of an undeviating focus on the self. Both groups are analysts of the psyche, which is 
the broad approach targeted in the novel.  
13 Bradley noted that ‘the novel seeks to distinguish two ways of understanding philosophy: the first as a system 
of thought ... the other more like a process, or way of being, a matter, to borrow from Montaigne, of learning 
how to die’ (19). Yet he concluded that there was ‘something oddly attenuated about The Pages ... too much of 
the book feels underworked, even contrived ... [it] lacks the crafted elegance of Bail’s best work’ (20), while 
Flanery asserted, concerning the author’s view of Roger and Wesley Antill, ‘it is unclear what side Bail is on’, 
and of the book’s conclusion that ‘this limp ending is something of a disappointment (23). 
14 This disjunction, already pronounced in German idealism, was arguably augmented by the mathematically-
inspired approach to logic promoted in the early twentieth century by Frege in Jena, and Russell in Cambridge. 
This brief genealogy, of course, begs the question of how their legacy was transformed by Wittgenstein, and the 
Austrian’s wider influence (see Grayling 25-82, Stroll 37-47). His writings certainly interested Bail and his 
actual life may have inspired aspects of Wesley’s portrayal; however, these complex issues lie outside the scope 
of the present paper.  
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15 Typically his reasons for summoning Rosie to join him in Europe were self-centred: ‘Aside from wanting to 
see Rosie, and be comforted by her, I had the idea of showing her my progress, how I had changed, I mean how 
I had improved, how I had become wiser’ (185). 
16 This is a mark of their blossoming ‘friendship, as only two women know how’ (164), and in pointed contrast 
to her relationship with Sophie. 
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